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speechless)
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I suggest that morphological defectiveness arises when the learner fails to discover a pro-
ductive/default process in a morphological category. The detection of productivity, or lack
thereof, can be accomplished by the Tolerance Principle, a simple mathematical model of
language learning and generalization. In this paper, I show that the absence of *amn’t, the
negative contracted form of am, in most English dialects can be predicted on purely numer-
ical basis. Implications for language acquisition, variation, and change are also discussed.
1 From Irregular Verbs to Productivity
In my first linguistics talk, which was also my job interview at Yale, I proposed that
English irregular past tense is not learned by forming associations between the stem and
the inflected form, contrary to the dominant view in the psychological study of language
(Rumelhart & McClelland 1986; Pinker 1999). Rather, irregular past tense is generated
by morpholexical rules. These rules do not generalize beyond a fixed list but are rules
nevertheless, in the sense that they take the stem (e.g., think) as the input and generate
an output (e.g., thought), the inflection, via a computational process of structural change
(e.g., “Rime ! /ɔt/”). I was approaching the problem as a computer scientist: rules
are most naturally realized as a list of if-then statements, for regulars and irregulars
alike, which turns out to be the approach taken throughout the history of linguistics
(Bloch 1947; Chomsky & Halle 1968; Halle & Marantz 1993) including Steve’s own work
(1973; 1992). There is in fact developmental evidence for the rule-based approach when
I reanalyzed the past tense acquisition data purportedly confirming the associationist
account (Yang 2002b).
I supposed Steve was at least somewhat persuaded by the argument; a few months
later I got the job. But he did wonder aloud after the talk, with a quizzical frown-cum-
smile that only he can manage: “But how does a rule wake up in the morning and decide
to be irregular?”
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Indeed. Since words do not wear tags of (ir)regularity, any morphological theory that
recognizes regularity and irregularity, which is pretty much everything on the market,
must say something about how a rule or process wakes up to be irregular. In fact, the-
ories that reject such a categorical distinction (e.g., Hay & Baayen 2003; McClelland
& Patterson 2002) ought to be off market. Children’s morphological productivity is
strongly discrete; see Yang 2016: Chapter 2 for a cross-linguistic review. Their errors
are almost exclusively over-regularizations of productive rules. This is quite well known
thanks to the past tense debate: for example, the past tense of hold sometimes surfaces
as holded, with the “-d” rule (Marcus et al. 1992). What is not widely known and even
less appreciated is the near total absence of over-irregularization errors, despite frequent
anecdotes to the contrary (e.g., bite-bote, wipe-wope, think-thunk, etc.; Bowerman 1982;
Bybee 1985; Pinker 1999). These errors are sufficiently rare, occurring in about 0.2% of
English-learning children’s past tense use, that Xu & Pinker (1995) dub them “weird past
tense errors”. Not a single instance of bote, wope, thunk, or many conceivable analog-
ical patterns can be found in the millions of child English words in the public domain
(MacWhinney 2000). The distinction between regular and irregular rules was in fact
observed in Berko’s (1958) original Wug test. While children were quite happy to add
“-d” to novel verbs such as rick and spow, only one out of eighty six subjects irregular-
ized bing and gling, although adults are often prone to form irregular analogies in an
experimental setting.1
So Steve’s question sent me on a long quest. To maintain that both regulars and irreg-
ulars are computed by rules, I needed a story of how children separate out productive
and unproductive rules so precisely and effortlessly. Although a solution was worked
out shortly after (Yang 2002a), it took me many years to fully recognize the scope of the
productivity problem – one of the “central mysteries” in morphology (Aronoff 1976: 35)
– and the challenges it poses.
At a first glance, it doesn’t seem difficult to give an answer for English past tense. The
rule “add -d” covers most verb types in the language and can thus be deemed regular, as
“statistical predominance” has always been regarded as the hallmark of the default (e.g.,
Nida 1949: 14). But this is surely too simplistic when crosslinguistic and psychological
factors are taken into account. More concretely, at least four empirical problems, each of
which is illustrated with a familiar example in (1), fall under the productivity problem.
(1) a. English past tense: That a default rule is learned abruptly and results in over-
regularization, after a protracted stage of rote memorization (Marcus et al.
1992; Yang 2002b).
b. English stress: That the grammar of English stress (Chomsky & Halle 1968;
Hayes 1982; Halle & Vergnaud 1987) is not trochaic with a list of lexical excep-
tions despite an overwhelming majority of English words bearing stress on
the first syllable (Cutler & Carter 1987; Legate & Yang 2013).
1 This suggests that the Wug test and similar methods such as rating have task-specific complications and
should not be taken as a direct reflection of an individual’s morphological knowledge; see Schütze 2005
and Yang 2016 for discussion.
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c. German noun plurals: That a suffix (“-s”) can be the productive default despite
coverage of fewer nouns than any of its four competitors (Clahsen et al. 1992;
Wiese 1996).
d. Russian gaps: That morphological categories needn’t and sometimes do not
have a default, as illustrated by the missing inflections of certain Russian verbs
in the 1st person singular non-past (Halle 1973).
In Yang (2016), I propose a model of productivity, the Tolerance Principle, which pro-
vides a unified solution for the problems in (1), as well as similar problems that involve
inductive learning in phonology, syntax, and language change. In this paper, I revisit
Steve’s question which, in a significant way, drove this project forward. My focus is on
a topic that has featured prominently in Steve’s recent research: morphological gaps and
the nature of defectiveness in word formation (e.g., Anderson 2008; 2010b).
2 The Tolerance Principle
The development of the Tolerance Principle started as a purely formal conjecture: How
would one represent a rule (R) and the exceptions of that rule (e.g., a set of wordsw1,w2,
…, wn )? If one is committed to a mechanistic account of the matter – like a computer
programmer, for instance – perhaps the only way to encode rules and exceptions is
through a set of conditional statements:
(2) If w = w1 Then …
If w = w2 Then …
…
If w = we Then …
Apply R
This of course immediately recalls the Elsewhere Condition, ever present in linguistics
since Pāṇini (Anderson 1969; Aronoff 1976; Kiparsky 1973; Halle & Marantz 1993). In
particular, the data structure in (2) entails that in order for a (productive) rule to apply
to a word, the system must scan through a list to ensure that it is not one of the exceptions
(w1, w2, …, we ).
There is something perverse about (2). For example, to produce walked, one must
scan through the irregular verbs to make sure that walk is not found on the list. But a
moment of reflection suggests that the Elsewhere Condition makes perfect sense. The
alternative to listing the irregulars would have to be listing the regulars. One can imag-
ine assigning each regular verb a flag, which immediately triggers the application of
the “add -d” rule. But that would imply that the morphological status of every word
must be committed to special memory; the irregulars as well, since they are by defini-
tion unpredictable. Perhaps even more surprisingly, there is broad behavioral support
for the irregulars-first-regulars-later representation of rules; see Yang 2016: Chapter 3
for review. The psycholinguistic evidence comes from real-time processing of words
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and morphology. When irregulars and regulars are suitably matched for various fac-
tors (e.g., stem and surface frequency) that affect the speed of processing, irregulars are
recognized and produced significantly faster than regulars – which is consistent with
the algorithmic interpretation of the Elsewhere Condition as a computational model of
language processing.
From (2), then, we can develop an empirically motivated cost-benefit calculus for the
price of exceptions. Specifically, words that fall under a productive rule must “wait”
for the exceptions to be processed first: the more exceptions there are, the longer the
rule will have to wait. Under very general assumptions about word frequencies, we can
prove:
(3) Tolerance Principle
Suppose a rule R is applicable to N items in a learner’s vocabulary, of which e are
exceptions that do not follow R. The sufficient and necessary condition for the
productivity of R is:
e  θN where θN := NlnN
The Tolerance Principle requires two input values, N and e , and returns the productivity
status of a rule. Its application requires a well-defined rule such that N and e can be
measured, by the child learner during language acquisition and by the researcher when
studying linguistic productivity. To learn the structural description of a rule, typically in
the form of “X  ! Y”, one will need to invoke inductive learning models such as those
studied in artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and indeed linguistics (e.g., Chomsky
1955). Almost all inductive models form generalizations over specific learning instances
and try to discover the shared characteristics of individual elements associated with a
shared pattern. For example, suppose two good baseball hitters can be described with
feature bundles [+red cap, +black shirt, +long socks] and [+red cap, +black shirt, +short
socks]. The rule “[+red cap, +black shirt]  ! good hitter” will follow, as the shared
features (cap, shirt) are retained and the conflicting feature (sock) is neutralized. Obvi-
ously, the application of inductive learning must encode the structural constraints on
the human language faculty and other cognitive systems implicated in language acqui-
sition (Chomsky 1965). While it is clear that the properties of human language are far
from arbitrary, it remains an open question to what extent they reflect a unique system
of Universal Grammar (e.g., Merge; Berwick & Chomsky 2016) or general principles of
cognition and learning that show continuities with other domains and species; see Yang
2004; Chomsky 2005; Yang et al. 2017 for general discussions.
Table 1 provides some sample values of N and the associate threshold value θN .
The apparently, and perhaps surprisingly, low threshold has interesting implications
for language acquisition. Most importantly, it suggests that all things being equal, smaller
vocabulary (smaller values of N ) can tolerate relatively more exceptions. That is, pro-
ductive rules are more detectable when learners have less experience with a language,
especially when they have a small lexicon that only consists of relatively high frequency
words. This may explain children’s remarkably early command of the main ingredients
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Table 1: The tolerance threshold for rules of varying sizes
N θN %
10 4 40.0
20 7 35.0
50 13 26.0
100 22 22.0
200 38 19.0
500 80 16.0
1,000 145 14.5
5,000 587 11.7
of language (Yang 2013), as well as the reason why maturational constraints may aid
rather than hamper language acquisition (Newport 1990); see Yang 2016: Chapter 7 for
extensive discussion.
The Tolerance Principle has proved highly effective. In Yang (2016), it was applied
almost 100 times, making accurate productivity predictions across many languages and
domains using only corpus statistics. Furthermore, experimental studies in collabora-
tion with Kathryn Schuler and Elissa Newport have found near categorical confirmation
for the Tolerance Principle in artificial language studies with young children (Schuler,
Yang & Newport 2016). Some of these robust results are unexpected. This is because the
derivation in (3) makes use of numerical approximations that only hold when N is large.
In the empirical case studies, however, the value of N is often very modest (e.g., 8 or
9 in the artificial language studies) as it refers to the number distinct lexical items in a
morphological category. For the moment, I put these questions aside and return to the
problems in (1): the low threshold of exceptions provides just the right approach to the
productivity problem across languages.
Consider first the acquisition of English past tense. Through an inductive process il-
lustrated earlier, the phonological diversity of the regulars will quickly establish that
any verb can take the “-d” suffix. Its productivity will be determined by the total number
of verbs (N ) and the irregulars (e) in the learner’s vocabulary. The same consideration
applies to the irregular rules. For instance, the seven irregular verbs bring, buy, catch,
fight, seek, teach, and think all follow the stem change “ought”. Such a mixed bag of
phonological shapes will also yield an all-inclusive rule, as shown by computational im-
plementations (Yip & Sussman 1998). But the “ought” rule will fare terribly. It only works
for seven items, with hundreds and thousands of exceptions, far exceeding the tolerance
threshold. As a result, the rule will be relegated to lexicalization. Other irregular pat-
terns can be analyzed similarly: as I show elsewhere (Yang 2016: Chapter 4), they all
wake up nonproductive in the morning, thereby accounting for the near total absence
of over-irregularization errors (Xu & Pinker 1995).
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Following the same logic, we can see that the emergence of the “-d” rule will require a
long period of gestation. Although children can quickly induce its structural description
– using no more than a few dozen verbs (again Yip & Sussman 1998) – their early verbs
will contain many irregulars. Of the top 200 verbs inflected in the past tense (MacWhin-
ney 2000), 76 are irregulars. Because θ200 is only 37, it follows that children who know
some 200 most frequent verbs cannot recognize the productivity of “-d” despite its “sta-
tistical predominance”. During this period of time, even though verbs may be produced
with the “-d” suffix, they are in effect irregular: the suffix has no productivity and does
not extend beyond a fixed list rote-learned from the input. The telltale evidence for pro-
ductivity comes from the first attested overregularization errors (Marcus et al. 1992). For
individual learners with reasonably complete records of language development, the Tol-
erance Principle can help us understand why the regular rule becomes productive at
that exact moment it did. For example, “Adam”, the poster child of English past tense
research (Pinker 1999), produced his first over-regularization error at 2;11: “What dat
feeled like?” In the transcript of almost a year prior to that point, not a single irregular
verb past tense was used incorrectly. It must be that by 2;11, Adam had acquired a suf-
ficiently large number of regulars to overwhelm the irregulars. To test this prediction, I
extracted every verb stem in Adam’s speech until 2;11. There are N = 300 verbs in all,
out of which e = 57 are irregulars. This is very close to the predicted θ300 = 53, and
the small discrepancy may be due to the under-sampling of the regulars, which tend
to be less frequent and thus more likely missing from the corpus. The critical point to
note here is that Adam apparently needed a filibuster-proof majority of regular verbs
to acquire the “-d” rule: this is strongly consistent with the predictions of the Tolerance
Principle as illustrated in Table 1.
The problems of English stress and German plurals in (1) are similar. In the English
case, the assignment of stress to the first syllable may be transiently productive when
the child has a very small vocabulary (Kehoe & Stoel-Gammon 1997; Legate & Yang 2013).
But it will fail to clear the tolerance threshold when the vocabulary reaches a modest
size: even 85% of coverage is not sufficient for larger values of N (e.g., 5000; Table 1). In
the German case, none of the five plural suffixes can tolerate the other four as excep-
tions, not least the “-s” suffix, which covers the smallest set. In both cases, the learner
will carry out recursive applications of the Tolerance Principle. When no rule emerges
as productive over the totality of a lexical set, the learner will subdivide it along some
linguistic dimension, presumably making use of constraints on language and other cog-
nitive systems, and attempt to discover productive rules within. Such a move, while more
complex, is always more likely to yield productive rules: again, smaller N ’s that result
from subdividing the lexicon tolerate a relatively higher proportion of exceptions than
larger N ’s. For the acquisition of stress, dividing words into nouns and verbs and taking
the syllabic weight into account, as prescribed by all modern metrical theories, lead to
productive rules of stress assignment, an outcome that accords well with both structural
and behavioral findings (Ladefoged & Fromkin 1968; Baker & Smith 1976; Kelly 1992;
Guion et al. 2003). The study by Legate & Yang (2013) also reveals important differences
between theories of stress in their statistical coverage of the English lexicon: while all
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theories handle a great majority of English words, only the theory of Halle 1998 clears
the tolerance threshold of exceptions. For the acquisition of German plurals, the move is
to subdivide the nouns by grammatical gender as well as phonological conditions, sim-
ilar to certain theoretical approaches to German morphology (e.g., Wiese 1996). The -s
suffix indeed survives as the default because the other suffixes are productive with more
restrictive domains of nouns.
The emergence of morphological gaps is a logical outcome of the Tolerance Principle,
which constitutes the topic of the present study. When a rule wakes up irregular, the
learner must learn, from positive evidence, the inflected form for each word. Failing to
hear a particular inflected form will render the speaker speechless when that form is
needed.
3 Why Am+Not ≠ Amn’t?
3.1 Conditions on Gaps
Many current theories of morphology, including Distributed Morphology (for which
see Halle & Marantz 1993), Optimality Theory (Prince & Smolensky 2004), Dual-Route
Morphology (Pinker 1999; Clahsen 1999), Network Morphology (Brown & Hippisley
2012), Paradigm Function Morphology (Stump 2001) and others, invoke the notion of
competition, which by design results in a default or winning form (at least in the in-
flectional domain). This architectural feature of the theories is inherently incompatible
with the existence of morphological gaps, which are quite widespread across languages
(Baerman, Corbett & Brown 2010). The Tolerance based approach, while also competi-
tion based (through the Elsewhere Condition), does not stipulate a default or productive
rule as a primitive in the theoretical machinery. Rather, the presence or absence of a
productive rule is the outcome of language acquisition, to be determined by children
through the composition of the linguistic data. More specifically, the Tolerance Princi-
ple provides the following corollary (Yang 2016: 142):
(4) Conditions on gaps
Consider a morphological categoryC with S alternations, each affecting Ni lexical
items (1  i  S), and Íi Ni = N . Gaps arise in C only if:
8i; 1  i  S;
Õ
j,i
Nj > θN
That is, none of the alternations (Si ) in N are sufficiently numerous to tolerate all the rest
(Íj,i Nj ) as exceptions: no productive alternation will be identified. The speaker must
hear the morphological realization of every word inC; if any is to slip through the cracks,
a defective gap appears. I should note that in the conception and application of the Tol-
erance Principle, the terms such as “category” and “alternation” are meant to be general
and not restricted to morphology per se. For instance, “category” can be interpreted as
any well-defined structural class with a finite number of elements (phonemes, words,
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morphosyntactic structures, the directionality of a finite number of functional heads,
etc.), and “alternation” can be understood as any outcome of a computational process
defined over such a class. The Tolerance Principle asserts that in order for a productive
pattern to emerge, one of the alternations must be statistically dominant. Elsewhere I
have studied several well-known gaps in English, Polish, Spanish, and Russian (Yang
2016: Chapter 5). Their presence is predictable entirely on numerical ground, requiring
nothing more than tallying up the counts of the lexical items subject to each alterna-
tion. In what follows, I provide a Tolerance Principle account of another much-studied
instance of a defective paradigm.
3.2 The Statistics of N’t Gaps
In many dialects of English, n’t is not permitted to contract onto auxiliary verbs such
as am and may, as seen in the unavailability of, for example, “*I amn’t tired” and “*You
mayn’t do that” (e.g., Anderwald 2003a; Bresnan 2001; Broadbent 2009; Frampton 2001;
Hudson 2000; Zwicky & Pullum 1983). Following Zwicky & Pullum (1983), I will assume
that the contracted negative n’t is an inflectional affix. The question is why n’t cannot
attach to all auxiliary verbs residing in the Tense node. From the perspective of the
Tolerance Principle, the emergence of gaps must result from a critical mass of exceptions
to the contraction process.
Let us consider the behavior of the auxiliary hosts for n’t. Zwicky & Pullum (1983:
p508) provide a near comprehensive list, which I revise with some additional information
in Table 2.
Table 2 provides the frequencies of the auxiliary verbs and their negation in both
uncontracted and contracted forms in the 520-million-word Corpus of Contemporary
American English (COCA; Davies 2008). Given the heterogeneity of the textual sources,
a handful tokens of amn’t and mayn’t can be found albeit at very low frequencies. The
n’t-contracted forms of shall and dare – shan’t and daren’t – are also impossible for most
American English speakers but are included here for completeness. Although shan’t is
often perceived as a stereotypically British English feature, it seems to be vanishing
across the pond as well. In a 6.6-million-word corpus of British English (MacWhinney
2000), not a single instance of shan’t is found. And its frequency of usage has been in a
steady decline since 1800, the beginning date of the Google Books Corpus. As of daren’t,
the OED does not provide any citation and it has always been very rare throughout the
period of the Google Books Corpus. These gapped forms are marked by?.
The prescriptively maligned ain’t ([eɪnt]), however, is robustly attested for am, are, is,
have, and has in COCA as well as a six-million-word corpus of child-directed American
English (MacWhinney 2000). Since the phonological form of [eɪnt] is unpredictable from
the auxiliary host, it is boldfaced in Table 2 to mark its idiosyncrasy, along with a few
other exceptions to which I return later. Note that the frequency estimates of the ain’t
forms are approximate. First, I only counted strings where ain’t is immediately preceded
by a pronoun – the majority case, but sentences with a lexical subject (e.g., “Kids ain’t
ready”) are not included. Second, because both be and have can take on ain’t, the counts
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Table 2: The morphophonological alternation of n’t contraction
aux+not n’t contraction (%)
could [kud] 45,256 [kudn̩t] 106,123 70.104
did [dɪd] 128,432 [dɪdn̩t] 342,202 72.711
does [dʌz] 72,194 [dʌzn̩t] 164,922 69.553
had [hæd] 27,410 [hædn̩t] 46,987 63.157
has [hæz] 28,529 [hæzn̩t] 29,578 50.255
has [hæz] 28,529 [eɪnt] 749 1.273
have [hæv] 24,957 [hævn̩t] 45,849 63.868
have [hæv] 24,957 [eɪnt] 981 1.367
is [ɪz] 189,538 [izn̩t] 100,164 34.275
is [ɪz] 189,538 [eɪnt] 2,537 0.868
might [maɪt] 14,780 [maɪtn̩t] 78 0.525
must [mʌst] 4,156 [mʌsn̩t] 917 18.076
need [nid] 3,705 [nidn̩t] 1,235 25.000
ought [ɔt] 1,031 [ɔtn̩t] 66 6.016
should [ʃud] 20,577 [ʃudn̩t] 25,576 55.416
was [wʌz] 97,457 [wʌzn̩t] 141,384 59.196
would [wud] 46,205 [wudn̩t] 85,853 65.012
am [æm] 10,258 ∅ 5 0.041
am [æm] 10,258 [eɪnt] 2,046 16.622
are [ar] 89,083 [arnt] 50,137 35.602
are [ar] 89,083 [eɪnt] 1,073 0.765
can [kæn] 75,531 [kænt] 201,060 72.692
dare [dɛər] 320 ∅ 25 7.246
do [du] 81,074 [dont] 654,576 88.979
may [meɪ] 36,195 ∅ 12 0.033
shall [ʃæl] 1,271 ∅ 123 8.824
were [wr]̩ 41,224 [wrn̩t] 35,120 46.002
will [wɪl] 39,068 [wont] 86,158 68.802
for the auxiliaries are parceled out by extrapolating from the frequencies of the regularly
contracted n’t forms.2 For instance, there are 2,054 instances of “you/they ain’t”: the
“share” for are is based on the count of “aren’t” (50,137) relative to “haven’t” (45,849).
2 Here I gloss over the fact that there are English dialects in which ain’t is also an alternative form of negative
contraction for do, does, and did (e.g., Labov et al. 1968; Weldon 1994). It would be difficult to estimate their
frequencies but formally, this use of ain’t serves to create additional (unpredictable) exceptions to the
contraction process which, as we discuss below, contributes to the breakdown of productivity and the
emergence of gaps.
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This amounts to 52.2% of 2,054, or 1,073, as recorded in the Table. Finally, the estimate of
ain’t as the contraction of am + n’t cannot follow a similar process because, of course,
amn’t is gapped. I thus allocated roughly 75% of the “I ain’t” counts, which is the share
of “I am not” out of the total of “I am not” and “I have not”, to the contraction of am not.
For these five auxiliaries that can be realized as ain’t, the percentage of the contracted
forms are based on the sum of uncontracted, n’t-contracted, and ain’t-contracted forms.
More precise estimates are certainly possible but as we will see, the exact frequencies
are not especially important for our purposes: it is more pertinent to approximate a
“typical” English speaker’s experience with these forms. Roughly, we would like to know
whether an English speaker will have encountered a specific phonological word at all, by
using some independently motivated frequency threshold (e.g., once per million; Nagy
& Anderson 1984): it is evident that the frequency of ain’t is sufficiently high for this
threshold despite our rough estimates.
A tempting approach to gaps is to appeal to indirect negative evidence (Chomsky
1981; Pinker 1989). A strong version takes the shape of lexical conservatism: do not use a
form unless it is explicitly attested. This recalls Halle’s [-Lexical Insertion] treatment of
gaps in his classic paper (1973) and can be found in recent works as well (e.g., Pertsova
2005; Steriade 1997; Rice 2005; Wolf & McCarthy 2009). A weak version makes use of
frequency information. For instance, if amn’t were possible, language learners would
have surely heard it in the input, especially since am is highly frequent and would have
had plenty of opportunities to undergo n’t contraction. Its conspicuous absence, then,
would provide evidence for its ungrammaticality (e.g., Daland, Sims & Pierrehumbert
2007; Sims 2006; Baerman 2008; Albright 2009).
Traditional acquisition research has always viewed indirect negative evidence with
strong suspicion (Berwick 1985; Osherson, Stob & Weinstein 1986; Pinker 1989). Research
on the amn’t gap (e.g. Hudson 2000) has also questioned its usefulness. However, with
the recent rise of probabilistic approaches to language acquisition especially Bayesian
models of inference, the field has seen a revival of indirect negative evidence. If the
conception of learning is a zero-sum – or more precisely, one-sum — game which assigns
a probabilistic distribution over all linguistic forms, the unattested will necessarily lose
out to the attested, at least in most probabilistic models of language learning. A thorough
assessment of indirect negative evidence within a probabilistic framework is beyond the
scope of the present paper; see Niyogi 2006; Yang 2015; Yang et al. 2017. But a careful
statistical examination of gaps serves to reveal its deficiencies. Note that the question is
not whether indirect negative evidence can account for some missing forms: the absence
of amn’t is indeed unexpected under any reasonable formulation. The real challenge is to
ensure that indirect negative evidence will pick out only the gapped forms but nothing
else, while keeping in mind that morphological inflection is generally not gapped but
fully productive, readily extending to novel items.
Two observations can be made about the frequency statistics in Table 2, which sug-
gest that indirect negative evidence is unlikely to succeed. First the n’t forms of several
auxiliaries such as might and need are in fact quite rare. They appear considerably less
frequently than once per million, which is generally regarded as the minimum threshold
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to guarantee exposure for most English speakers (Nagy & Anderson 1984). In the six-
million-word corpus of child-directed American English (MacWhinney 2000), mightn’t
appears only once, needn’t appears only twice, and mustn’t does not appear at all. In
the other words, these n’t forms may be so rare that they are in effect absent for many
children (Hart & Risley 1995). Lexical conservatism thus will not distinguish them from
the truly gapped amn’t, mayn’t, daren’t, and shan’t, the last of which is in fact more fre-
quently attested in COCA. Second, consider a statistical interpretation of indirect nega-
tive evidence. The last column of Table 2 provides the percentage of the n’t contraction
out of all negated forms. An auxiliary with an unusually low ratio may mean that it has
performed below expectation and could be a clue for its defectiveness. However, the
statistics in Table 1 suggest otherwise. It is true that amn’t and mayn’t have very low
ratios: this fact alone is not remarkable because these are indeed gaps. But exactly how
low should a ratio be for the learner to regard a contracted form to be defective? On the
one hand, we have mightn’t and oughtn’t at 0.525% and 6.016%, and these are not defec-
tive. On the other hand, we have daren’t and shan’t at 7.246% and 8.824%, but these in
fact are defective. There doesn’t appear to be a threshold of frequency or probability that
can unambiguously distinguish gapped from ungapped items.
3.3 N’t Contraction in Language Development and Change
Let’s see how the Tolerance Principle provides an account of the amn’t gaps. The simplest
approach is to consider all the auxiliary verbs and their n’t contractions collectively as a
homogeneous set. Using the once-per-million threshold as a reasonable approximation
of a typical American English speaker’s vocabulary, and taking the size of the Corpus
of Contemporary American English (520 million words) into account, there are 18 auxil-
iaries with reliably attested n’t forms. The four gapped forms are all below this threshold
and are thus excluded from consideration. It is important to clarify that, unlike various
forms of lexical conservatism and indirect negative evidence discussed earlier, we do
not regard the absence of these forms as evidence for their defectiveness. Rather, the
learner’s task is to deduce, on the basis of the 18 well-attested forms, including amain’t,
that n’t contraction is not a productive pattern in the English auxiliary system.
This is quite easily accomplished. Of the 18 auxiliaries, n’t is realized as follows:
(5) a. [n̩t]: could, did, does, had, need, should, was, would (8)
b. [eɪnt] in variation with either [nt] or [n̩t]: have, has, is, are (4)
c. [nt]: can, were (2)
d. idiosyncratic vowel change: do, will (2)
e. [eɪnt]: am (1)
f. [n̩t] but idiosyncratically deletes [t] in the auxiliary (see Zwicky & Pullum
1983: 508–509 for discussion): must (1)
For any of these alternations to be productive, it must have no more than θ18 = 6 excep-
tions. The most promising [n̩t], which applies to 8 auxiliaries and thus has 10 exceptions,
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is a long way off. Even if we are to include the [n̩t]-taking have, has, and is and ignore
the unpredictable variant [eɪnt] form, the rule “nt  ! n̩t” still falls short of productivity.
Thus, the learner will be able to conclude, from the Conditions on Gaps (4), that n’t con-
traction is not a productive process for English auxiliaries and must be learned lexically.
If amn’t fails to appear in the input, it will be absent. Only after the learner has already
concluded that a category does not have a productive rule can they start to regard the
absence of evidence as evidence of absence.
The preceding analysis, while correctly identifies the n’t gaps, has some inadequacies.
For one thing, based on the 18 contracted forms, the primary evidence for language ac-
quisition, learners would also identify mustn’t and oughtn’t as gapped as they fall below
the minimum frequency of once per million. This is not necessarily a fatal shortcoming:
mustn’t and oughtn’t are still considerably more frequent than amn’t andmayn’t, the two
genuinely gapped forms, and children may acquire them in later stages of acquisition.
But more significantly, as Steve pointed out to me in a personal communication (unre-
lated to the current celebratory volume), the preceding brute-force approach misses an
important structural generalization. Table 2 is divided into two halves on Steve’s advice.
As he insightfully observes, none of the auxiliaries that ends in an obstruent is gapped;
these are listed in the top portion of the Table. By contrast, gaps are only found in the
auxiliaries that do not end in an obstruent, which are listed in the bottom portion of the
Table.
If we carry out a Tolerance analysis along the feature [obstruent], a much more
elegant and interesting pattern emerges. For the 12 [+obstruent] auxiliaries, only four
have exceptions – has, have, is, and must – just below θ12 = 4. Thus, English learners
can identify a productive rule:
(6) nt  ! n̩t / [+obstruent] #
This immediately accounts for the fact that speakers generally accept the forms mightn’t
and oughtn’t despite their very low frequencies (well below once per million): these
two auxiliaries, of course, follow the structural description of (6). By contrast, amn’t,
mayn’t, daren’t, and shan’t, some of which appear more frequently than mightn’t and
oughtn’t, are generally rejected because they fail to meet the structural descriptions of
the productive rule in (6).
Consider now the six [-obstruent] auxiliaries in the bottom portion of Table 2. Here
am and are have [eɪnt], can and were add [nt], and do and will have idiosyncratic vowel
changes. Since the Tolerance threshold θ6 = 3, no distinct pattern will be identified as
productive: lexicalization is required and gaps are predicted for mayn’t, daren’t, shalln’t,
and of course amn’t.
The calculation here is very delicate but it is interesting to push the Tolerance Principle
to the limit. What if the child has not learned ain’t as the n’t-contracted form for am
and are? Although ain’t forms are quite robustly attested in COCA as well as in child-
directed English, they are still strongly dialectal and are, at least in the input to some
children, less frequent than the “regular” forms such as aren’t, isn’t, haven’t, and hasn’t.
If so, a child during an early stage of acquisition may in effect have only five [-obstruent]
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auxiliaries and their contracted forms to learn from: namely, are, can, do, were, and will.
Here the statistically dominant pattern of “nt  ! [nt] / [-obstruent] # ” does reach
productivity: the two idiosyncratic exceptions of do and will fall below the threshold of
θ5 = 3, and n’t contraction is predicted to be transiently productive!
Bill Labov (personal communication) distinctly recalls being a young amn’t speaker
only to exit that stage at a later time. Indeed, we can find attested examples in Amer-
ican English-learning children’s speech. The three examples in (7) are taken from the
CHILDES database (MacWhinney 2000):
(7) a. I amn’t a dad. (Kate/Kim, 3;6: Sawyer Corpus 3-12-92.cha)
b. I’m doing this puzzle well, amn’t I? (Mark, 3;11: MacWhinney Corpus 67b1.cha)
c. Amn’t I clever? (Mark, 3;11: MacWhinney Corpus 67b2.cha)
The reader is encouraged to listen the audio recordings of the examples in (7) in the
CHILDES database. The first child’s identity is unclear due to discrepancies in transcrip-
tion. The examples from Mark can be heard as the investigator’s exact revoicing (Brian
MacWhinney, personal communication). Although three examples seem quite rare, it is
worth noting that almost all am’s are contracted onto the pronoun (i.e., I’m not). Of the
one million American English child utterances, there are only 42 full forms of am fol-
lowed by negation (i.e., I am not), which makes the three amn’t errors not so negligible.
Of course, everyone eventually hears ‘I ain’t’: from pop songs on radio if not from the im-
mediate family and friends. Thus, amn’t will disappear according to the Tolerance-based
analysis, for ain’t introduces an additional exception which leads to the breakdown of
productivity for the [-obstruent] class.
Corroborative evidence for the (transient) productivity of n’t contraction can also be
found in other auxiliaries. To my great surprise, there are numerous instances of willn’t
as the negative contracted form of will and whyn’t for ‘why don’t/didn’t’ in the speech
of many parent-child dyads, apparently all from the New England region. Other than
enriching the empirical data on contraction, willn’t and whyn’t do not tell us much about
the productivity of n’t contraction or its acquisition: if parents use them frequently, and
they do, children will follow. Nevertheless, willn’t can also be found in the spontaneous
speech of children who are not from the New England region:3
(8) a. No we willn’t. (Ross 2;9, Colorado, MacWhinney Corpus 26b2.cha)
b. Oh it willn’t fit in there (Marie 6;6, Ontario, Evans Corpus dyad07.cha)
c. He willn’t be a good boy (Jared 6;7, Ontario, Evans Corpus dyad19.cha)
Perhaps most strikingly is an utterance produced by Sarah, a child from the Harvard
studies (Brown 1973):4
(9) And the reindeer saidn’t.
3 Brain MacWhinney (personal communication) confirmed that the only time he or his wife ever used willn’t
was when transcribing Ross’s speech.
4 The contraction of n’t onto the main verb as in (9) was attested in the history of English: see Brainerd 1989
for caren’t (‘don’t care’) and Jespersen 1917 for bettern’t, usen’t, and indeed whyn’t.
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Taken together, the examples in (7), (8), and (9) suggest that n’t contraction is at least
transiently productive for some English-learning children.
Ross’s willn’t presents an especially interesting opportunity for studying the produc-
tivity of n’t contraction. The CHILDES corpus contains a relatively extensive record
of Ross’s longitudinal language development. We can then study his auxiliaries and
contractions, and subject his individual grammar to the kind of fine-grained analysis
of Adam’s past tense (§2). By the time Ross produced No we willn’t, he had used 9 n’t-
contracted auxiliaries:
(10) a. couldn’t, didn’t, haven’t, isn’t, wouldn’t
b. aren’t, can’t, don’t, won’t
If Ross had not started partitioning the auxiliaries by the [obstruent] feature, the
N = 9 examples in (10) supports the productive use of n’t contraction because the four
examples in (10b) are below the number of tolerable exceptions (θ9 = 4:2). The 5/4 split
between rule-governed and exceptional items is exactly the stimuli used in the artificial
language study (Schuler, Yang & Newport 2016) where children nearly categorically gen-
eralized the rule. If he failed to distinguish the syllabic [n̩] in (10a) and the nonsyllabic
[n] in aren’t and can’t in (10b), it would have been even easier for n’t contraction to
reach productivity. Thus, Ross’s productive use of n’t contraction in (8) is predicted by
the Tolerance Principle.
The naturalistic evidence from child language is admittedly thin, but it suggests that
the emergence of the amn’t and other gaps in the auxiliary system may be due to the
use of ain’t. Again, the gaps would not be the result of mutual exclusivity: there are
doublets such as haven’tain’t etc. so amn’t and ain’t could have coexisted side by
side. Gaps arise/arose because the form of ain’t weakens the numerical advantage of n’t
contraction, pushing it below the Tolerance threshold.
Finally, a little historical detective work bolsters our treatment of the amn’t gap.5 Ac-
cording to Jespersen (1917: 117), “the contracted forms seem to have come into use in
speech, though not yet in writing, about the year 1600.” The change appears to have
originated in non-standard speech before spreading to mainstream usage. Subsequent
scholarship, however, places the date to a somewhat later time (e.g., 1630, Brainerd 1989:
181; see also Warner 1993: 208–209). Pursuing the results from the Tolerance-based anal-
ysis, we can make two observations.
First, it is likely that n’t-contraction was at one point productive, which seems espe-
cially effective for the [+obstruent] auxiliaries; see also (9) and fn 4. Brainerd’s study
finds that didn’t, hadn’t, shouldn’t, and wouldn’t appeared from 1670s, soon after the n’t
contraction appeared in the English language. These were followed by couldn’t, mightn’t,
needn’t, and mustn’t in the 18th century, and the last to join the group was oughtn’t in
the 19th century, first attested in Dicken’s 1836 The Village Coquette. Thus speakers at
that time must have formed a productive contraction rule for [+obstruent] auxiliaries,
perhaps like the one given in (6). Following this line of reasoning, we make the pre-
5 I am grateful to Anthony Warner for pointing out the important study of Brainerd 1989.
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diction, admittedly one that is difficult to test, that if a new [+obstruent] auxiliary is to
appear in the language, it will be immediately eligible for n’t contraction.
Second, and in contrast to the [+obstruent] class that had been expanding the num-
ber of n’t contractible auxiliaries, the [-obstruent] class has been steadily losing mem-
bers. Interestingly, the [-obstruent] auxiliaries were quite systematically available for
n’t contraction by the end of the 17th century (Brainerd 1989). Of special interest are of
course those that were n’t contracted in the past but are presently gapped. According
to Brainerd’s study, the first instance of shan’t appeared in 1631, mayn’t in 1674, daren’t
in 1701: all three are now gapped. The very fact that they fall out of usage points to
the non-productivity of n’t contraction for these [-obstruent] auxiliaries: in general, a
productive rule would have gained rather than lost members.
How, we wonder, did the [-obstruent] class lose its productivity? Much more detailed
historical investigation will be needed but an interesting hypothesis can be offered as
follows. The historical development of n’t contraction may mirror the trajectory of lan-
guage acquisition by children; that is, ontogeny may recapitulate phylogeny. Our dis-
cussion of children’s n’t contraction in modern American English suggests that the use
of ain’t for am not, which children probably acquire later during acquisition, increases
the number of exceptions for the contraction process. It is conceivable that the emer-
gence of ain’t, an unpredictably contracted form of am not, was also the culprit for the
breakdown of productivity.
Historically, an’t/a’nt surfaced as the contracted form of am not between 1673 and
1690. But by the early 1700s, an’t/a’nt began to be used for both am not and are not (Brain-
erd 1989: 186). Whatever the phonological cause for this convergence, or how/when ain’t
joined the fray, the effect is that am not no longer had a predictable form of contraction.
If our analysis of children’s amn’t and willn’t is correct, then we would find amn’t and
ain’t to be in complementary distribution: If a dialect does not allow ain’t for am not,
amn’t would be possible; otherwise amn’t would be gapped.
The most direct evidence for this suggestion comes from the dialectal distribution of
amn’t, and its correlation with ain’t. The OED notes that amn’t is present in “nonstan-
dard” American English and various northern parts of the UK. There is little to sug-
gest that amn’t is possible in American English at all; all the five occurrences in COCA
come from Scottish and Irish writers.6 It is remarkable, then, that Scotland and Ireland
have “traditionally completely ain’t-free dialects” (Anderwald 2003b: 520): it is precisely
in these regions where amn’t is robustly attested, both in the century-old The English
Dialect Dictionary (Wright 1898) and in recent dialect surveys of English (Anderwald
2003a).7
Before I conclude this section, it is important to clarify the scope of the present anal-
ysis. The Tolerance Principle, through Conditions on Gaps (4), can identify defective
morphological category where gaps may emerge. Such categories are defined by the
6 The corpus of child-directed American-English, surprisingly, contains one instance of amn’t: “I am stirring,
amn’t I?” It was produced by Colin Fraser, on staff in Roger Brown’s Harvard study of language acquisition
(1973). A little Internet research reveals that Fraser, later a Cambridge scholar with a few psychology
textbooks to his credit, is a native of Aberdeen.
7 I would like to thank Gary Thoms for discussion for the distribution of amn’t in Scottish English.
225
Charles Yang
structural descriptions of rules. It does not predict, at least synchronically, which items
within these categories will be gapped. That issue, in my view, is completely a matter
of usage frequency: if the inflected form of an item in a defective category is used very
rarely or not at all, it will be gapped. Of course, it is also possible that no gaps are found
in a defective morphological category, if all items happen to be inflected sufficiently fre-
quently. In that case, however, we do predict that if a novel item matches the structural
description of a defective category, the speaker will be at a loss to produce an inflected
form. Thus, the emergence of gaps, just as the calibration of productivity, is determined
by the composition of the input data. Finally, the preliminary work on the history of n’t
contraction suggests that the Tolerance Principle can be applied to the study of language
change. It makes concrete predictions about productivity – the rules that could gain new
members, and the rules that could only lose existing members – as long as the relevant
values of N and e from historical data can be reliably estimated. The reader is referred
to Yang 2016 for a case study of the so-called dative sickness in Icelandic morphosyntax.
4 Gaps in I-language
Halle’s classic paper (1973) contains the much criticized proposal that gaps are caused by
the [+Lexical Insertion] feature associated with certain forms. As noted earlier, this kind
of lexical conservatism is difficult to reconcile with the unbounded generativity of word
formation, and similar approaches using indirect negative evidence are also unlikely to
succeed. But in a footnote of that very paper, Halle proposes an alternative approach
which he himself regards as equivalent but has almost never been discussed by other
researchers:
The proposal just sketched might be modified somewhat as regards the treatment
of words formed by rules that traditionally have been called “nonproductive”. One
might propose that all words formed by non-productive rules are marked by these
rules as [-Lexical Insertion]. The smaller subset of actually occurring words formed
by such rules would then be listed in the filter with the feature [+Lexical Insertion].
… In other words, it is assumed that words generated by a productive process are
all actually occurring and that only exceptionally may a word of this type be ruled
out of the language. On the other hand, words generated by a nonproductive rule
are assumed not to be occurring except under special circumstances. In this fashion
we might capture the difference between productive and nonproductive formations
(5).
Hetzron (1975), while arguing against Halle’s [+Lexical Insertion] proposal, makes
essentially the same suggestion. Rules are either productive or lexicalized, and gaps
arise in the unproductive corners of the grammar. His conception of gaps can be strongly
identified with the Elsewhere Condition, a critical component of the present theory:
The speaker must use ready-made material only for “exceptional” forms, while ev-
erywhere else he could very well “invoke the word formation component”. Tech-
nically, this can be represented by a disjunctive set of rules where idiosyncratic or
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“exceptional” formations are listed with as much explicitness as necessary, while
the general word formation rules would appear afterward, with the power to apply
“to the rest” (871).
That is, gaps arise when productivity fails. The problem of gaps thus reduces to the
problem of productivity. Some subsequent proposals have adopted a similar approach
(Albright 2009; Baronian 2005; Hudson 2000; Maiden & O’Neill 2010; Pullum & Wil-
son 1977; Sims 2006), including Steve’s own account (2010): gaps result from conflicting
forces in word formation such that the output form becomes unpredictable and thus
unrealized. The Tolerance Principle provides a precise solution of what makes a rule
productive, and its application to gaps reinforces the general position that gaps and pro-
ductivity are two sides of the same coin.
The Tolerance Principle is a provable consequence of the Elsewhere Condition and
follows from the general principle of efficient computation: the child prefers faster gram-
mars, a “third factor” in language design par excellence (Chomsky 2005). In fact, a
stronger claim can be made in favor of such an analytical approach. I submit that a
descriptive analysis of languages, however typologically complete or methodologically
sophisticated, cannot in principle provide the right solution for productivity. First, as
noted earlier, the categorical nature of children’s morphological acquisition suggests
that productivity must be demarcated by a discrete threshold (see also Aronoff 1976: 36).
But note that such a threshold is empirically undiscoverable. Productive processes will
lie above the threshold and unproductive processes will lie below, but with arbitrary
“distance” from it in both cases. Thus, the threshold cannot be regressed out of the data.
Second, while linguists now have an ever expanding arsenal of investigative tools to
study productivity, ranging from the Wug test to fMRI to Big Data, the psychological
grammar is developed without supervision in a matter of few years; these new empiri-
cal methods presently are at best a description of the speaker’s grammatical knowledge
and not yet learning models that account for how such knowledge is acquired. Finally,
even if we were to discover the threshold of productivity through a statistical analysis –
e.g., a productive rule must hold for at least 85% of eligible words – it would still remain
mysterious why the critical value is exactly what it is, rather than 80% or 90%.
In other words, an I-language approach to productivity is needed, one which builds
exclusively on the inherent constraints on language and cognition that all children have
access to, with deductively established properties that must hold universally across lan-
guages. The study of language as a part of human biology, I believe, is an approach
that Steve endorses and pursues (Anderson & Lightfoot 2002), which can be seen in his
writings on morphology and related issues (Anderson 2010a; 2015).
Finally, a personal note. It is no exaggeration to say that I owe my professional career
to Steve. He managed to create a position for me at Yale, which kept me close to my
young family and thus linguistics, and further away from the seductive fortunes in the
tech sector. It was also Steve who taught me, more effectively than anyone, the difference
between linguistic evidence and rhetoric. It has been a privilege to learn from him. To
figure out how to wake up irregular took over 15 years; the answer, I hope, is to his
satisfaction. It may once again win me a spot, this time in the Linguistic Club of Ashville,
North Carolina.
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